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Introduction
Despite the passage of 50 years since 
an armistice ended military hostilities, the 
Korean peninsula remains divided, a Cold 
War vestige that seemingly has been unaf-
fected by the evolution that has occurred 
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elsewhere.  If  anything,  US  confrontation 
with  North  Korea—a  charter  member  of 
its “axis of evil”—has intensified in recent 
years.  Yet  today,  increasing  numbers  of 
South  Koreans,  accustomed  to  living  for 
decades  in  the  shadows  of  the  North’s 
forward-deployed  artillery,  do  not  regard 
the  North  as  a  serious  threat.  Growing 
prosperity  and  confidence  in  the  South, 
in marked contrast to the North’s isolation 
and  penury,  have  transformed  fear  and 
loathing into pity and forbearance. Instead, 
it is the United States, an ocean away, that 
regards the North and its nuclear weapons 
program with alarm. As the United States 
has focused on the nuclear program, its 
ally, South Korea, has observed the North 
Koreans’  nascent  economic  reforms  and 
heard  their  talk  of  conventional  forces 
reduction, and the gap in the two coun-
tries’ respective assessments of the North 
Korean  threat  has  widened  dangerously, 
threatening to undermine their alliance.
Increasing numbers of South 
Koreans, accustomed to living for 
decades in the shadows of the 
North’s forward-deployed artillery, 
do not regard the North as a serious 
threat. . . . Instead, it is the United 
States, an ocean away, that regards 
the North and its nuclear weapons 
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The divergence in threat perceptions has been 
reinforced by differences in attitudes toward a host 
of issues that have emerged in the post-9/11 world. 
Within  South  Korea,  long-standing  resentments, 
alleged  American  arrogance,  unilateralism,  rac-
ism,  and  recent  specific  irritants—including  the 
perceived denigration of the “Sunshine Policy” and 
President Kim Dae-jung by the Bush administration 
during the March 2001 summit, and the deaths of 
two South Korean schoolgirls in a military training 
accident and the subsequent acquittals of the US 
service  personnel  involved—contributed  to  mas-
sive  anti-American  demonstrations  in  November 
and December 2002. With respect to issues beyond 
the peninsula, research on public opinion in South 
Korea  indicates  a  growing  favorable  interest  in 
China, a general lack of support for the US-led war 
on terrorism, and subsequently, for the US-led war 
against Iraq. Consideration by the National Assem-
bly of legislation authorizing South Korea’s modest 
noncombatant support of the war provoked another 
round of at times violent demonstrations in opposi-
tion  to  the  government  policy.  The  Pew  Research 
Center for People and the Press survey on “What the 
World Thinks in 2002” revealed that of 27 countries 
surveyed, the percentage of the South Korean pub-
lic having a favorable image of the United States ex-
ceeded the percentage in only four other countries.
The relationship between the United States and 
South Korea operates on many levels. The economic 
relationship is one important aspect. The question 
naturally  arises  whether  the  economic  ties  could 
mitigate conflict in other aspects of the overall rela-
tionship between the two countries or whether eco-
nomic irritants could further exacerbate conflict.
The Economic Relationship and its Evolution
In 2002, total trade turnover between the United 
States and South Korea was $58 billion, up slightly 
from the previous year but well below its peak of 
$67 billion in 2000. For several years, South Ko-
rea has been America’s sixth largest export market 
(behind Canada, Mexico, Japan, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom) and its fourth largest market for 
agricultural products. Last year, the United States 
ran  a  $13  billion  merchandise  trade  deficit  with 
South Korea.
From the South Korean perspective, the share of 
merchandise exports to the United States has fallen 
dramatically from more than 40 percent in the late 
1980s to less than 20 percent in 2002, with China 
actually surpassing the United States as South Ko-
rea’s number one export destination in some recent 
months (figure 1). Similarly on the import side, after 
briefly supplanting Japan as South Korea’s primary 
supplier of imports in the late 1990s after the Asian 
financial crisis, the US share of South Korean im-
ports has once again begun drifting downward, and 
in 2002 the United States supplied less than 15 per-
cent of South Korea’s merchandise imports.
Bilateral trade in services, cross-border invest-
ment, and local sales by majority-owned foreign af-
filiates have grown more robustly than merchandise 
trade. The share of services trade in South Korean 
GDP doubled to 15 percent over the decade to 2001, 
and the United States is the major supplier of ser-
vices to the South Korean economy, running a $3.3 
billion bilateral surplus in 2002.
The  provision  of  services  generally  requires 
investment—if  only  to  establish  a  local  presence. 
Historically,  South  Korea  maintained  an  unwel-
coming  stance  toward  foreign  direct  investment 
(FDI)—indeed, South Korea and India were the only 
countries in Asia where the primary mode of US in-
vestment was minority-stake joint ventures rather 
than  majority-stake  joint  ventures  or  fully  owned 
subsidiaries.  Policy  reform  and  market  pressure 
have encouraged an expansion of FDI into South 
Korea after the Asian financial crisis. As shown in 
figure 2, the inward flow of foreign investment from 
all sources experienced a one-time surge as foreign 
investors  bought  out  their  Korean  joint-venture 
partners and then subsequently declined (as it did 
elsewhere in the world). As of 2000, South Korea 
ranked 23rd out of 25 OECD member countries in 
stock of inward FDI as a share of GDP, besting only 
Japan and Iceland.
The  flow  of  US  investment  into  South  Korea 
increased much more rapidly than trade after the 
Asian  financial  crisis,  peaked  between  1999  and 
2001, and then declined, though it remains signifi-
cant. (Indeed, according to US government figures, 
the stock of US investment in South Korea grew by 
more than 10 percent in 2002.) In recent years, the 
United States has been the single largest investor in 
South Korea, though in some years, European in-
vestment may have exceeded US investment in the 
The question naturally arises whether the 
economic ties could mitigate conflict in 
other aspects of the overall relationship 
between the United States and South Korea 
or whether economic irritants 
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Figure 1  South Korean exports, 1980–2003
Note: Three-month moving average.
Source: Bank of Korea Statistics Database.
Figure 2  South Korean direct investment, 1980–2002
Note: Based on balance of payments. 
Source: Bank of Korea Statistics Database.Number PB 03-6 May 2003 4
aggregate. According to South Korean data, Europe 
still owns a larger cumulative stock of investment 
than the United States. Japan trails far behind the 
United States and Europe, and China is essentially 
a nonfactor with regard to inward FDI. 
The  increase  in  investment  is  also  intimately 
tied to the growth of services trade (which typically 
requires a local presence) as well as local sales of 
South Korean affiliates of foreign firms. In 2000, the 
most recent year for which data are available, ma-
jority-owned affiliates of US firms racked up sales 
of $1.7 billion in South Korea (while South Korean 
affiliates in the United States had sales of $385 mil-
lion).
In sum, the United States remains an important 
economic partner for South Korea, though the char-
acter of that relationship is changing. South Kore-
ans perceive that American prominence in merchan-
dise trade is eroding, especially in comparison with 
China. However, in the emerging areas of services 
and investment, the US role is growing. In essence, 
the United States is losing its relative prominence in 
the older, more slowly growing parts of economic life 
and is building an increasingly prominent position 
in the newer, more rapidly expanding areas. 
Economic Policy Issues
Over  the  last  quarter-century,  South  Korea 
has greatly reduced the protection of its domestic 
market. The share of imports in the South Korean 
economy  increased  to  42  percent  despite  a  sub-
stantial  decline  in  the  real  exchange  rate  since 
the financial crisis. In agriculture, rice is the only 
product still subject to quantitative restrictions. Yet 
bound tariffs average 62 percent, and a number of 
agricultural products remain subject to tariff-rate 
quota schemes. The external barriers are reinforced 
by trade-distorting internal supports. Producer sup-
port, measured as monetary transfers to agriculture 
as a share of the total value of output at domestic 
producer  prices,  stood  at  64  percent  in  2001—a 
figure higher than that of Japan, twice the OECD 
average, and 20 times higher than that of the United 
States. The result is that South Korean consumers 
face food prices that are more than two-and-a-half 
times the world level.
In the industrial sector, tariffs have been cut to 
levels comparable to other OECD member countries, 
and quantitative import restrictions eliminated. The 
share  of  imports  in  the  domestic  consumption  of 
manufactures  is  higher  than  that  of  the  United 
States and more than three times higher than in 
Japan. Within the industrial sector, the most prom-
inent disputes involve the semiconductor industry, 
where the United States has imposed a 57 percent 
countervailing  duty  on  chips  produced  by  Hynix; 
the steel industry, where South Korea (among oth-
ers) has taken the United States to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO); and the motor vehicles sector, 
where South Korea exported 468,607 automobiles 
to the United States in 2002 while importing only 
3,283. 
In  the  services  sector,  US  interest  centers  on 
financial services, particularly residual restrictions 
on foreign access in the insurance and banking sec-
tors. South Korea is the second largest insurance 
market in Asia with $47 billion in premiums paid 
in fiscal year 2001, and while the sector has been 
significantly liberalized, residual restrictions on the 
activities of foreign firms, especially in the nonlife 
insurance area, remain.
The government maintains a substantial owner-
ship stake in the banking system as a legacy of na-
tionalizations undertaken during the 1997–98 cri-
sis. According to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), when combined with government ownership 
in specialized and development banks, as of mid-
2002, nearly 60 percent of the assets of the South 
Korean banking sector are government-controlled. 
Since  1998,  the  share  of  foreign  ownership  has 
tripled from about 10 percent to more than 30 per-
cent as foreign ownership restrictions were relaxed 
with respect to nationalized banks undergoing re-
structuring to induce fresh capital and managerial 
know-how.
Labor-market issues are the most widely cited 
impediments to investment in both surveys of US 
investors and formal grievances filed with South Ko-
rean government. This is ironic inasmuch as labor 
militancy is at least partly a product of the govern-
ment’s financial-sector policies. The unwillingness 
of creditors (often ultimately the government) to im-
pose hard budget constraints on management obvi-
ates any incentive for union leaders to compromise 
in  negotiations.  The  Roh  Moo-hyun  government’s 
stated  goal  of  revitalizing  former  President  Kim 
Dae-jung’s Tripartite (business, labor, government) 
Commission  has  raised  additional  concerns  that 
South Koreans perceive that American 
prominence in merchandise trade is eroding, 
especially in comparison with China. 
However, in the emerging areas of services 
and investment, the US role is growing.Number PB 03-6 May 2003 5
South Korea may be headed toward a corporatist 
labor-market  model  along  continental  European 
lines.  Policies  and  institutions  matter:  although 
South  Korea,  the  United  States,  and  France  all 
have similar unionization rates, labor-market prac-
tices differ significantly between the United States 
and France.
A second impediment to investment is a lack of 
transparency in financial accounting. The impact on 
FDI is particularly acute. In the 2002 A.T. Kearney 
annual survey of corporate executives, South Korea 
placed 21st in the “FDI confidence index,” lagging 
such countries as India, Poland, and Thailand. In 
the “opacity index” calculated by the consulting firm 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, South Korea ranked 31st 
out of 34, beating Russia, Turkey, and Indonesia 
but trailing countries such as Egypt and Romania. 
According to PwC’s econometric model, if South Ko-
rea could achieve the average transparency level of 
the United States, Chile, the United Kingdom, and 
Singapore  (the  least  opaque  economies  in  North 
America, South America, Europe, and Asia, respec-
tively),  admittedly  a  tall  order,  it  would  triple  its 
FDI inflow. 
   
Modalities
Despite  this  discussion  of  ongoing  sources  of 
friction,  economic  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  South  Korea  would  appear  to  be  less 
contentious than they were 10 or 20 years ago. One 
can point to three reasons. The first is changes in 
the  composition  of  trade.  The  increasingly  intra-
industry nature of bilateral trade would be expected 
to create less of an adjustment burden for import-
competing sectors.
Secondly,  economically  rational  or  not,  the 
single best predictor of US trade policy actions is 
the rise of the bilateral trade imbalance. The United 
States has recently been through a period in which 
it ran surpluses or relatively modest deficits with 
South Korea. The counterpart to the rise of China in 
South Korea’s trade pattern is the growing promi-
nence of China in the United States. In effect, South 
Korea has fallen off the radar screen, supplanted by 
China, together with the perennial foci of US trade 
policy complaints, Japan and the European Union.
Finally, there have been changes in both policy 
and the institutional environment. Nearly a quar-
ter-century  of  liberalization  in  South  Korea  has 
made a significant dent in the ubiquity and restric-
tiveness of policy-derived impediments to trade in 
South Korea. This reduction in fuel for the fire has 
been reinforced by the formation of the WTO, which 
has provided a less visibly politicized and bilateral 
forum for the United States and South Korea to re-
solve their trade differences.
Both countries have made use of the WTO dis-
pute settlement mechanism in managing bilateral 
trade disputes, each initiating six cases. For both 
countries,  the  prospect  of  binding  WTO  rulings 
has encouraged bilateral “out of court” diplomatic 
settlements. When this has not been possible, both 
countries have won and lost cases, and thus far, 
the loser has brought its practices into conformity 
after adverse rulings. The big question is whether 
this will continue to be the case if the United States 
loses two pending steel-related cases. 
 
Preferential Trade Initiatives
A final issue confronting the United States and 
South  Korea  is  their  participation  in  preferential 
trade  agreements,  which  can  potentially  help  or 
harm  both  members  and  third-party  nonmem-
bers. At present the most relevant of these is US 
participation  in  the  North  American  Free  Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which may have had a nonneg-
ligible adverse impact on South Korea by diverting 
trade and investment to Mexico and which certainly 
stimulated the proliferation of preferential arrange-
ments globally. South Korea recently completed its 
first preferential agreement—a free trade area (FTA) 
with Chile.
Of greater relevance looking forward, however, 
are prospective preferential arrangements in North-
east Asia, including a Japan–South Korea FTA, a 
Japan–South Korea–China FTA, and an ASEAN+3 
FTA (ASEAN plus Japan–South Korea–China). Pres-
ident Roh has also mentioned bringing North Korea 
into the fold. However, the credibility of these pro-
posals is questionable in light of the participants’ 
WTO  obligations,  most  obviously  that  sectorally 
selective FTAs are not permitted—trade restrictions 
must be abolished in “substantially all sectors.” For 
South Korea, Japan, and their potential partners, 
In Washington, the rise of China has meant 
a diminution of at least relative attention 
paid to South Korea, while in Seoul the rise 
of China has added to interest in regional 
initiatives—which if implemented could 
harm the United States.Number PB 03-6 May 2003 6
the question is how this requirement relates to their 
economically  inefficient  but  politically  influential 
agricultural sectors. (Agriculture is also the reason 
why occasional proposals for a US–South Korea FTA 
are not credible.)
A number of studies have attempted to model 
the impact of these proposals. The South Korean 
and Japanese governments commissioned studies 
of an FTA (Cheong 1999; Yamazawa 2000) that has 
been the subject of investigation by Brown, Dear-
dorff,  and  Stern  (2001)  and  Scollay  and  Gilbert 
(2001) as well. All four studies use static comput-
able general equilibrium (CGE) models to evaluate a 
prospective Japan–South Korea FTA. These models 
have significant limitations, notably their inability 
to  capture  dynamic  economic  effects  and  the  ab-
sence of any reaction functions on the part of other 
trading nations. Nevertheless, they are the obvious 
starting point for any serious analysis of a prospec-
tive FTA. All reach similar conclusions: an FTA with 
South Korea would have a limited impact on Japan 
and a potentially negative impact on South Korea. 
(To ameliorate this politically unpalatable outcome, 
Yamazawa  conjures  up  exogenous  productivity 
increases  that  generate  welfare  improvements  for 
both economies—but these are caused by the as-
sumed  productivity  shocks—not  trade  liberaliza-
tion.  Cheong  achieves  the  same  result  through 
unspecified “preferential rules of origin” and the in-
clusion of China into the FTA.) Cheong does not dis-
cuss the impact on the United States, but the other 
three studies find that the United States would be 
adversely affected by trade diversion. Brown, Dear-
dorff, and Stern find that the United States would 
benefit if the FTA expanded to include the ASEAN+3; 
Scollay and Gilbert reach the opposite conclusion.
An explicitly dynamic model of a Japan–South 
Korea FTA, produced by McKibbin, Lee, and Cheong 
(2002) under the auspices of a South Korean gov-
ernment think tank, obtains a positive impact on 
Japan  and  Korea  but  a  negative  impact  on  the 
United States as well as some other Asian coun-
tries. That said, the detrimental impact should not 
be overstated: according to one study, the fall in US 
welfare due to a Japan–South Korea FTA would be 
between $200 million and $300 million annually—a 
magnitude similar to the self-inflicted losses stem-
ming  from  the  15  outstanding  antidumping  (AD) 
orders against South Korean producers.
Conclusions
The economic relationship between the United 
States and South Korea, characterized by increasing 
intraindustry trade, rising services trade, expand-
ing  intercorporate  penetration,  and  growing  FDI, 
appears to be evolving toward something more like 
the relationships that the United States maintains 
with most other rich OECD countries. This expan-
sion of bilateral interdependence is not without its 
irritants, however—the motor vehicles sector is an 
exception to the trend of rising intraindustry trade; 
steel  remains  a  perennial,  though  not  essentially 
bilateral, problem; and AD practices in the United 
States,  and  capital  channeling  in  South  Korea  to 
support Hynix are the sources of ongoing disputes. 
Yet the trade relationship is not as contentious 
as it was 10 or 15 years ago. This is due in part to 
liberalization in South Korea and the formation of 
the WTO that has provided the two countries with 
a less politicized forum in which to resolve their dif-
ferences. 
It is also due to the declining relative importance 
of the two countries in each other’s global relation-
ships—at least with respect to merchandise trade. 
In Washington, the rise of China has meant a dimi-
nution of at least relative attention paid to South 
Korea, while in Seoul the rise of China has added 
to  interest  in  regional  initiatives—which  if  imple-
mented could harm the United States.
The  net  result  may  well  be  a  decoupling  of 
relative interests that could reinforce the widening 
strategic differences between the two historic allies, 
especially if South Koreans come to regard China 
and Japan as acting more constructively than the 
United States with regard to North Korea.
The net result may well be a decoupling 
of relative interests that could reinforce 
the widening strategic differences between 
the two historic allies, especially if South 
Koreans come to regard China and Japan as 
acting more constructively than the United 
States with regard to North Korea.Number PB 03-6 May 2003 7
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